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Abstract
The vulnerability of health sector to corruption lies in the complex
interaction between the social environment and the institutional set-
ting of health systems. We investigate this interaction in the case of
Italy, speciﬁcally looking at the impact of corruption on health expen-
diture. In Italy corruption is a social phenomenon. Health sector has
been often involved in corruption oﬀences and decentralized health ex-
penditure is considerably out of control. We show that the impact of
corruption on health expenditure is positive, along with ageing pop-
ulation, technological change and supply factors inducing demand in
pharmaceuticals and hospitalization. Moreover, the empirical analy-
sis demonstrates that corruption aﬀects pharmaceutical expenditure
and accredited private hospital expenditure, suggesting implications
for health governance and policy.
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1 Introduction
In recent years a growing literature [surveyed in 1, 2] has investigated the
eﬀects of corruption on the health sector. In developing and transitional
economies corruption lowers the quality of health care, limits the access to
health services and increases health expenditure. The general framework of
the determinants of corruption in public administration [3] is consolidated by
speciﬁc features of health sector: inelastic demand for health services, high
degree of asymmetric information, large variety of interacting actors (regula-
tors, payers, public and private providers, consumers) with opposite interests.
Several papers have showed how these features enhance corrupted practices
in the diﬀerent sectors of the health care; and it has been argued that the oc-
currence of corruption ﬁnds a favorable environment where social norms are
weaker and corrupt practices are tolerated or even justiﬁed [2-6]. Corruption
in health sector is a phenomenon in which social environment, health gov-
ernance and ﬁnancing are intertwined. Centralized or decentralized health
ﬁnancing may enhance diﬀerent levels of corruption, since diﬀerent are the
levels of ﬁnancial accountability. Public participation and local accountabil-
ity of public resources are in theory higher in decentralized than in centralized
ﬁscal systems [7]. In corrupted social environments the decentralization may
improve health outcomes [8, 9]; but it may also foster corruption [10], due to
the lacking of adequate institutional checks and balances at local level.
The evidence of the negative eﬀects of corruption on health outcomes [11,
12], implies that corruption directly aﬀects the amount of health expenditure.
Nevertheless, the role of corruption as a determinant of health expenditure
has not been speciﬁcally investigated. This paper concentrates on this issue,
investigating the case of Italy. Italian health expenditure is decentralized and
largely out of control; high levels of corruption place Italy 69 out of the 183
countries ranked in the Transparency International Corruption Perceptions
Index 2011 (bottom list, with Greece and Portugal of European countries),
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and health sector is involved in corruption oﬀences. In Italy, corruption
is rooted in political and economic history and its evolution has paralleled
the growth of public expenditure, culminated in the 1980’s. The impressive
emergence of corruption scandals in politics and public administration during
the 1990’s, overwhelmed the political system and favored the demand for an
institutional change in the direction of the decentralization and ﬁscal federal-
ism [13-17]. A relevant step toward decentralization was taken in the health
sector, that had not been immune from corruption scandals [18], following
a process aimed at improving the performance and constraining the costs
of health care. But decentralization has not controlled health expenditure
and has not prevented health sector from corruption. Health expenditure
amounts to 9.1% of GDP in 2008 and counts on average for 75 % of regional
public expenditures. The large amount of public resources and the inade-
quacy of regional health governance have made the health sector particularly
exposed to corruption, whose impact on health expenditure has been often
stressed by the national audit oﬃce [19, 20].
The purpose of this paper is to empirically investigate this impact in the
decade from 1998 to 2008. The investigation has been conducted on total
health expenditure and on its four main categories (pharmaceutical, primary
care, inpatient and accredited private hospital), focusing on the inﬂuence
of corruption along with demographic factors, per capita GDP and health
care inputs. Our results highlight the role of corruption as a determinant
of accredited private hospital expenditure and pharmaceutical expenditure,
suggesting implications for health governance and policy.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we present the
main features of Italian health system and expenditure; in section 3 and 4
we illustrate the data and the empirical model; the results are presented and
discussed in section 5; conclusions are drawn in section 6.
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2 Health system and expenditure in Italy
The Italian National Health Service (NHS), founded in 1978, is a univer-
sal health care system providing comprehensive health insurance coverage
and uniform health beneﬁts to the whole population. In the last 15 years
the Italian NHS has undergone, like other European countries, important
reforms [21], in the direction of decentralization of health management and
policy responsibilities to the sub-layers of government –21 administrative
jurisdictions, speciﬁcally 19 regions and two autonomous provinces. In 1999,
the reform of NHS introduced the essential levels of health services (ELS),
deﬁned and ﬁnanced by central government and provided by regional author-
ities. Since then regions have developed relatively diﬀerent health systems,
characterized by diﬀerent mix of public and accredited private hospitals.
The accreditation of private hospitals aims at reducing the monopoly power
of public providers and improving eﬃciency of health services, with a re-
imbursement scheme based on Diagnostic Related Groups (DRG) applied
to both public and accredited private hospitals. The 2001 Constitutional
reform has assigned the health sector to regional competency, but with rele-
vant regulating and ﬁnancing functions maintained by the central government
[22,23]. As result of this contradictory reform, Italian regions are required
to spend enough to provide ELS, while central government is required to ﬁ-
nance regions enough to provide ELS. Bailing out expectations from central
government and the separation of ﬁnancing responsibilities from expenditure
responsibilities have been considered a relevant stimulus for the uncontrolled
growth of Italian health expenditure [24-28] in a context of often inadequate
regional health governance and accountability [29-31].
Health expenditure has always been higher than the available funding,
with deﬁcits mainly concentrated in poorer regions [23, 26]. From 1998 to
2008 (Fig. 1) the trend of Italian health expenditure reﬂects the timing
of interventions by central government to ﬁnance regional health deﬁcits:
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in 2001 additional central government funds were allocated to cover NHS
deﬁcits accumulated since 1994; and in 2005, further central government
funds were allocated to cover NHS deﬁcit and regions, unable to contain
deﬁcits, underwent (centrally monitored) budgetary balance plans, whose
eﬀectiveness has been questioned [32,33].
(FIGURE 1)
3 The data
The empirical investigation of the determinants of Italian health expenditure
is based on a yearly panel data set for the 21 administrative jurisdictions
for the period 1998-2008. We collected data on public health system from
"Health for All" dataset [34] of Italian National Account. The public admin-
istration corruption rate has been gathered from Information system on jus-
tice [35]. In the ﬁrst part of our analysis we consider as dependent variable the
total per capita public health expenditure (TOT_HE). We ﬁrst control for
the basic determinants of public health expenditure: health care activity in-
puts, such as doctors rate (TOT_DOC) and beds rate (TOT_BEDS); time,
as a partial proxy for technological change (TIME);and socio-economic vari-
ables, such as regional per capita GDP (GDP), population density (DENS)
and population over 65 (POP_65). Finally, we speciﬁcally control for cor-
ruption rate (COR). By following Del Monte and Papagni [17], corruption is
deﬁned as the rate of crimes against public administration at regional level.
The number of crimes against public administration are based on statutes of
the ISTAT-Annals of Judicial Statistics1. In the second part of the analysis
we divide the total health expenditure into four main components: phar-
maceutical (PHARM), primary care (PRIM), inpatient (INP), accredited
1The crimes against the public administration included in the Papagni and Monte index
are bribery,extortion,misappropriation,embezzlement and abuse of oﬃce.
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private hospital (PRIV). As shown in table 1, per capita pharmaceutical is
the largest expenditure category (183 euros); followed by accredited private
hospital (93.4 euros), primary care (87.3 euros) and inpatient (43.6 euros)
expenditures.
In addition to the above listed determinants, we control each component
of the spending for speciﬁc health care inputs: medical prescriptions (PRES),
general practitioners (GP_DOC), physicians (PHYS_DOC), private special-
ists (PRIV_DOC) and private beds (PRIV_BEDS).
Variable deﬁnitions and summary statistics are given in table 1.
(TABLE 1)
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4 Empirical model
The empirical analysis has been conducted in two steps. Initially, we have
used a single-equation approach with ﬁxed and random eﬀects to examine
whether the variable of interest (i.e corruption) is signiﬁcantly correlated with
public health expenditure, after controlling for basic determinants of health
spending (such as regional Income, ageing, population density, doctors and
beds). In the second step, we have adopted a Seemingly Unrelated Regression
(SUR) to estimate the impact of corruption on the four main components of
public health expenditure in Italy: pharmaceutical, primary care, inpatient
and accredited private hospitals.
Tthe basic econometric speciﬁcation [36] is the following:
lnTOT _HEit= αi+β1 lnGDP it+β2 lnPOP _65it+β3 lnTOT _BEDit+ (1)
+β
4
lnTOT _DOT it+β5 lnDENSit+β6 lnCORit+β7TIMEit+εit
Where the subscripts i stands for region and t for time.
The dependent variable, total per capita public health expenditure, is re-
gressed on the standard socio-economic variables (such as income, population
ageing and density), corruption and the time trend. All variables are taken
in natural logarithms, allowing us to consider the estimated coeﬃcients as
elasticities.
In order to consider the impact of corruption on each component of health
expenditure, we employed a Seemingly Unrelated Regressor model (SUR),
originally introduced by Zellner [37]. Speciﬁcally we estimate four equations
as stochastically independent, of the following form:
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lnPHARM it= αi+β1 lnGDP it+β2 lnPOP _65it+β3 lnTOT _BEDit+ (2)
+β
4
lnTOT _DOT it+β5 lnPRESit+β6 lnDENSit+ lnCORit+β7TIMEit+εit
ln PRIM it= αi+β1 lnGDP it+β2 lnPOP _65it+β3 lnTOT _BEDSit+ (3)
+β
4
lnGP _DOCit+β5 lnDENSit+β6 lnCORit+β7TIMEit+εit
ln INP it= αi+β1 lnGDP it+β2 lnPOP _65it+β3 lnTOT _BEDSit+ (4)
+β
4
lnPHY S_DOCit+β5 lnDENSit+β6 lnCORit+β7TIMEit+εit
ln INP it= αi+β1 lnGDP it+β2 lnPOP _65it+β3 lnPRIV _DOCit+ (5)
+β
4
lnPRIV _BEDSit+β5 lnDENSit+β6 lnCORit+β7TIMEit+εit
Note that to obtain more robust estimates, we have investigated the
impact of corruption after controlling in each component of the spending
for speciﬁc covariants: medical prescriptions (PRES), general practition-
ers (GP_DOC), physicians (PHYS_DOC), private specialists (PRIV_DOC)
and private beds (PRIV_BEDS).
5 Results and discussion
Table 2 presents the estimation of the ﬁxed and random eﬀect of the ba-
sic model. The result of the Hausman test shows that the diﬀerences in
8
coeﬃcients between the two models are not systematic, thus implying that
the random-eﬀects (GLS) model is to be preferred. Therefore, the following
comments are based on the results obtained with the GLS.
Our ﬁndings conﬁrms that in Italy [38] ageing population is a relevant
determinant of health expenditure. In line with previous studies [36, 38-41],
the doctor rate and beds rate impact positively on health expenditure, sug-
gesting a supply induced demand for health services. Our estimates support
the observation that health expenditure is not a luxury good [42]; however,
income is positive and statistically signiﬁcant. This result implies an income
eﬀect, suggesting that, despite the universality of Italian health care system,
the (formally equal) access to health care services is not independent from
income and possibly related to the diﬀerent regional models of health de-
centralization. Time trend, interpreted as a partial proxy for technological
change, is positive and statistically signiﬁcant. This result conﬁrms the ob-
served evidence of the impact of technology on health expenditure [43,44].
Finally, the impact of corruption on health expenditure is positive and sta-
tistically signiﬁcant. This is a relevant result, which requires further speciﬁ-
cations: since the impact of corruption is expected to be diﬀerent among the
components of health expenditure.
(TABLE 2)
Table 3 shows the results of the SUR model with an R2=0.78 for the
pharmaceutical expenditure, 0.64 for primary care expenditure, 0.68 for in-
patient expenditure and 0.72 for accredited private hospitals expenditure, all
indicating a good ﬁt.
SUR estimates conﬁrm random eﬀects results for GDP only for the two
largest components of total health expenditure: pharmaceutical expenditure
[45] and accredited private hospital expenditure. The over 65 population sig-
niﬁcantly impacts on all the components of health expenditure; while popu-
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lation density only impacts on inpatient and accredited private hospital ex-
penditures. The number of beds exerts a negative impact on pharmaceutical
expenditure. A similar result has been found also in the case of Spain [46].
The coeﬃcients of physicians, general practitioners and private specialists
are positive and statistically signiﬁcant respectively on impatient, primary
and accredited private hospital expenditure, thus implying a supply induced
demand of hospitalization. As expected the prescriptions rate is positively
related to pharmaceutical expenditure. Technological change conﬁrms its
impact: time trend is positive and statistically signiﬁcant.
Our ﬁndings implies that corruption in health system is sectorial. The
estimated impact of corruption is positive for all the components of health
expenditure, but statistically signiﬁcant (99% conﬁdence level) only for phar-
maceutical expenditure and accredited private hospital expenditure. These
results appear to reﬂect the link between corruption and the institutional
setting of Italian health system. Regional health systems are characterized
by diﬀerent mix of public and private accredited hospitals. Nevertheless, this
form of competition has not prevented corruption and has showed an elusive
impact on eﬃciency [47], suggesting that performances are dependent from
the institutional setting in which hospitals operate. That is, more in general,
from the governance and regulation of regional health systems, often lacking
adequate monitoring and accountability procedures of health services provi-
sion. In this respect, our estimation result on the impact of corruption on
accredited private hospitals expenditure supports the observation that pri-
vatization of health services does not reduce corruption in the health sector
when public systems of regulation and control of private care and treatments
are inadequate or lacking [11].
Also the largely documented impact of corruption on the pharmaceu-
tical sector may be traced to the setting of public governance and regula-
tion. The pharmaceutical policies on procurement, quality control, pricing
and prescribing may elude accountability and transparency, fostering collu-
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sion between the involved actors [48-52]. In Italy, after the involvement in
corruption oﬀences, the pharmaceutical sector was reformed in 1993. Co-
payments schemes were introduced and from 2001 a new pricing scheme has
split the pharmaceutical market into two groups, according to the patent
situation and recognizing “premium prices” for innovative drugs. Recent
studies [53,54] show that this scheme incentives the promotion of products
more expensive and still under patent protection, whose consumption is a
relevant driver of Italian pharmaceutical expenditure, in a context of weak
regional policies of control on prescribing behaviors [20-55].
(TABLE 3)
6 Conclusions
The vulnerability of health sector to corruption lies in the complex interac-
tion between the social environment and the institutional setting of health
systems. In our study the role of this interaction emerges in the impact of
corruption on health expenditure in Italy. We have shown that this impact is
positive but also sectorial; and it is parallel to the impact of ageing popula-
tion, technological change and supply factors inducing demand in pharmaceu-
ticals and hospitalization. Speciﬁcally, the empirical analysis demonstrates
that corruption in Italy aﬀects pharmaceutical expenditure and accredited
private hospital expenditure, suggesting a relation between corruption and
the institutional setting of Italian health system. In this respect, decentral-
ization has not prevented the Italian health sector from corruption. The split
between the central government responsibility for health ﬁnancing and the
regional responsibility for health expenditure, has ampliﬁed the problems of
accountability in regional health care systems [24-25]. This situation has
made the Italian health sector more vulnerable to corruption. Thus conﬁrm-
ing that where corruption is systemic, the resistance to corruption in health
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sector is in appropriate systems of governance, monitoring and transparency
of the health care delivery process.
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variables Descriptions Obs. Mean
Std. 
Dev.
Min Max
TOT_HE Per capita Total public health expenditure (euro) 231 1457.4 282.63 883 2063
PHARM Per capita Public pharmaceutical expenditure (euro) 231 180.9 40.24 83 278
PRIM Per capita Public primary care expenditure (euro) 231 87.3 20.50 6 147
INP Per capita Public Inpatient and specialization  expenditure (euro) 231 43.6 20.60 12 110
PRIV Per capita Public Private-clinics expenditure (euro) 231 93.4 63.80 0 307
TOT_DOC Total Doctors per 10.000 pop. 231 18.7 2.40 12.82 23.88
PHYS_DOC Physician Doctors per 10.000 pop. 231 17.7 2.12 11.18 23.24
GP_DOC GP and paeditrians per 10.000 pop. 231 8.2 0.64 6.17 10.14
PRIV_DOC Private Doctor per 10.000 pop. 231 2.1 1.34 0 5.12
TOT_BEDS Total Beds  per 10.000 pop. 231 42.2 7.12 29.55 66.68
PRIV_BEDS Private beds per 10.000 pop. 231 6.7 4.66 0 24.54
PRES Medical prescriprions  per 10.000 pop. 231 7.5 1.66 3.84 12.03
GDP Per capita GDP 231 22256.4 5873.98 11449 33469
POP_65 Population (%) over 75 231 9.1 1.74 5.04 13.6
DENS Population density 231 176.7 105.60 105.6 426
COR Regional corruption rate, per 10.000 pop. 231 8.1 4.08 2.35 18.6
TIME Trend 231 - - 1998 2008
 Table 2. Econometric results: Fixed and Random effects 
 
Note that ***;**, * statistically significant at 1%,5% and 10% respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.SUR results 
 
The table reports coefficients and standard errors (in brackets) 
***;**, * statistically  significant at 1%,5% and 10% respectively. 
 
PHARM PRIM INP PRIV
GDP      0.362***
(0.059)
0.096
(0.106)
0.138
(0.179)
     1.098***
(0.243)
POP_65 0.121**
(0.063)
     0.105***
(0.019)
1.372***
(0.198)
1.137***
(0.263)
TOT_BEDS     '-0.235***
(0.066)
-0.123
(0.132)
-0.570
(0.203)
-
TOT_DOC 0.008
(0.096)
- - -
GP_DOC
-
   0.067**
(0.254)
- -
PHYS_DOC
- -
   1.075***
(0.261)
-
PRIV_DOC
- - -
    0.614***
(0.115)
PRIV_BEDS
- - -
-0.165
(0.111)
PRES      0.718***
(0.072)
- - -
DENS 0.021
(0.018)
0.012
(0.031)
0.367***
(0.042)
0.440**
(0.064)
COR      0.229***
(0.027)
0.048
(0.054)
0.084
(0.074)
    0.272***
(0.103)
TIME     0.016***
(0.005)
    0.058***
(0.009)
0.058***
(0.014)
  '0.025**
(0.016)
COST 0.789
(0.545)
4.845
(1.101)
3.064
(1.790)
5.051
(2.276)
R 2 0.78 0.64 0.68 0.72
Breush-Pagan-Test 42.56 p-value=0.0000
  
Figure 1. Trend of health expenditure in Italy (Var. %) 
 
Source: Health For All (ISTAT 1998-2008) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
